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El oxímoron de la protección temporal perpetua: Sirios en Turquía
Deniz SERT*
The crisis in Syria has entered its fifth year, becoming a protract-
ed conflict in international conflict terminology. Based on figures 
compiled by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refu-
gees (UNHCR), as of March 16, 2016, there were 4.8 million regis-
tered Syrians in the neighboring countries of Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, 
Lebanon, and Turkey. Data provided by the Directorate General 
of Migration Management (DGMM) in Turkey show that as of 
March 24, 2016, 2.75 million, or 57 % of the people mentioned 
above, were registered in Turkey. While 10 percent of the Syrians 
in Turkey were living in camps, the rest were dispersed in various 
Turkish cities. Three cities—Şanlıurfa, Istanbul, and Hatay—
host more Syrians combined (1.2 million) than the entire Euro-
pean continent, where the total Syrian asylum applications were 
935,008 for the period between April 2011 and January 2016.
The European Agency for the Management of Operational 
Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of 
the European Union (Frontex) says that in 2015, some 885,000 
migrants arrived in the EU via the eastern Mediterranean route, 
i.e., from Turkey to Greece. This number was 17 times higher 
than the number in 2014, which was already considered a record 
year. The Missing Migrants Project of the International Organi-
zation for Migration (IOM) reports that between January 1 and 
March 29, 2016, 149,534 people crossed the Aegean Sea to reach 
Europe, and that 366 of them lost their lives.
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In reaction to the large number of crossings, Turkey and the 
EU finalized an agreement, widely regarded as a dirty deal by 
critics, where Turkey promised to take back migrants who reach 
Greece irregularly, in return for the relocation of registered Syrian 
refugees from Turkey to Europe. This one-in, one-out deal, while 
forcing people back to Turkey, ideally would deter them from 
crossing the Aegean and collapse the human-smuggling trade. 
The deal was criticized because, in return, Turkey was promised 
that the EU would grant visa-free travel to Turkish citizens, as 
soon as the summer of 2016, accelerate Ankara’s EU membership 
application, and increase financial aid from 3 to 6 billion euros to 
help Turkey manage the refugee crisis. Also, the agreement pre-
sumes Turkey to be a safe third country, which is highly doubtful 
given the recent bombings, the situation in the southeast, and 
rising authoritarianism in the country.
We can argue that up until September 2, 2015, Europe had 
turned a blind eye to the Syrian refugee crisis. This was until the 
image of the dead body of a 3-year-old Kurdish Syrian boy named 
Alan Kurdi made it to the global headlines. Many people began 
to question what Europe was doing for these people, but very few 
people reflected on the question of why these people were trying 
to leave Turkey. A typical argument of a person in Turkey would 
be, “See, we have opened our borders to these people and gave 
them a safe haven, but Europe is closing its doors.” This argu-
ment was only partially true. Turkey did not follow an open door 
policy all the time and certainly not for everybody. Reports from 
the field showed that borders were periodically opened, and non-
Sunni Arab Syrians had a harder time crossing into Turkey. Since 
October 2015, Turkey has been following a closed-door policy.
Since the early 2000s, migration scholars, activists, and field-
workers have been arguing that Turkey was becoming a country 
of immigration and transit. However, it took the state a decade 
to come up with legislation to react to the phenomenon. Tur-
key passed its first law on migration and asylum, Law 6458 on 
Foreigners and International Protection, in 2013, which declares 
three types of international protection: refugees, conditional refu-
281NOTA CRÍTICA / ESSAY
gees, and subsidiary protection. Following the Geneva Conven-
tion, Article 61 of the law defines a refugee as
(a) person who as a result of events occurring in European coun-
tries and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons 
of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group 
or political opinion, is outside the country of his citizenship and is 
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself or herself 
of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality 
and being outside the country of his former residence as a result of 
such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return 
to it, shall be granted refugee status upon completion of the refugee 
status determination process.
 
The definition of a conditional refugee is largely similar, but 
owing to the geographical limitation that Turkey places on the 
convention, a conditional refugee is a person who becomes a refu-
gee as a result of events occurring outside European countries, 
and who “shall be allowed to reside in Turkey temporarily until 
they are resettled to a third country” (Article 62). Subsidiary pro-
tection is given to a “foreigner or a stateless person who could not 
be qualified as a refugee or as a conditional refugee” (Article 63).
Syrians in Turkey belong to neither of the categories. When 
they first arrived in Turkey in 2011 in large numbers, the gov-
ernment largely promoted them as guests who needed Turkish 
hospitability. Over time, it was realized that guest did not make 
any sense in terms of international law. Thus, Turkey created 
a temporary protection regime (TPR). “Temporary protection 
may be provided for foreigners who have been forced to leave 
their country, cannot return to the country that they have left, 
and have arrived at or crossed the borders of Turkey in a mass 
influx situation seeking immediate and temporary protection” 
(Article 91).
Thus, although we talk about a Syrian refugee crisis, in the 
Turkish context these people do not have the right to receive refu-
gee status. They do not even have the right to apply for condition-
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al refugee status to be resettled to a third country. They are under 
a temporary protection regime. What does temporary protection 
regime mean, in fact? I cannot go into the details of the negative 
psychological impacts of having temporary status for people who 
fled war and who are trying to hold on to their lives in a foreign 
country. However, this ongoing temporariness for the last five 
years has definite impacts on people’s daily lives.
Let me start with the issue of children’s education. In Turkey, 
47 % of the registered Syrian population is female, and 49 % is 
children below age 19. Syrian parents have various options to send 
their children to school, but there are many conditions to meet. 
To begin with, many families rely on their children to work. Child 
labor is becoming a big problem in Turkey. Thus, the first option 
for many families is not to send their children to school at all.
If families do not rely on their children to work, a second op-
tion is for the children to be registered at public schools. There 
are three main issues with this option. First, families have to be 
acquainted with the system. It is not very easy for Syrians to reg-
ister their children, although recently, many local groups have 
been helping families with the process. Second, not all schools 
have space in their classrooms. There is an undefined quota sys-
tem where principals use their discretion. Third, Syrian chil-
dren need to know Turkish to survive in the system. Turkey 
still has a Ministry of National Education, where education in 
the mother tongue is a very politically charged issue given the 
Kurdish question. 
A third option is to send Syrian children to a school that has 
a protocol with the Ministry of National Education, but families 
usually need to pay a registration fee that they often cannot af-
ford. Moreover, education in these schools is not necessarily secu-
lar, but usually follows a Sunni Islam curriculum. A final option 
is for families to send their children to a school without a protocol 
with the ministry, where all the negative conditions in the previ-
ous scenario prevail, in addition to that students’ diplomas will 
not be accredited in the system, blocking the students’ path to 
higher education. 
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Besides education, health services have also been problematic. 
All Syrians registered under the temporary protection regime have 
the right to go to public hospitals for treatment. A basic prob-
lem with this has been the language barrier between the hospital 
personnel and the patients. Many hospitals needed translators in 
Arabic and Kurdish, which were usually provided in ad hoc ar-
rangements thanks to the efforts of civil society. At the same time, 
there were many Syrian doctors and nurses whose services could 
not be utilized. Furthermore, in Istanbul, a city of 17 million 
people, for four years there was only one pharmacy that served 
Syrians with their prescriptions. Recently, there have been efforts 
to improve the services. There are clinics serving migrants, and 
more pharmacies providing medication. Better late than never.
Another major issue has been work permits. Turkey recently 
passed regulations to grant work permits to Syrians registered 
under the temporary protection regime. Accordingly, Syrians are 
allowed to take on seasonal work in agriculture and livestock. 
In other sectors, work permits are granted only when employers 
are supporting the application. Moreover, there is a quota system 
where in a factory of 100 workers, for example, an employer can 
only employ 10 Syrians. For smaller businesses with fewer than 10 
employers, the quota is for only one Syrian worker.
All in all, there seems to be a slow realization in Turkey that 
Syrians are not going anywhere any time soon, and that we have 
to start discussing different mechanisms of integration—policy 
makers prefer to use the word harmonization—. This is a hard 
task. Despite the findings presented by the migration literature, 
policy makers and the public are far from understanding integra-
tion as a two-way process. At the end of five years, public opinion 
about Syrians is turning negative. For many, increasing housing 
rents, loss of jobs, and whether Syrians will be granted citizenship 
are big concerns.
There are two important points that both policy makers and 
the public need to acknowledge: first, Turkey is no longer be-
coming a country of transit and immigration, but is a country 
of immigration. Even if the crisis in Syria were resolved today, 
many Syrians would not be able to return overnight. Moreover, 
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migration literature, especially case studies on forced migration, 
have shown that migration is usually a life-changing event for 
many where reverse patterns of mobility—return, but continuing 
transnational ties—are rarely observed. Second, while there is a 
general tendency to treat migration as a threat, there are many 
studies showing how migration can become an opportunity. We 
need to talk more about best practices. Many people whine about 
Syrians stealing local jobs, but very few consider companies estab-
lished by Syrians. Thus, policy makers need to listen to migration 
experts more than ever.
The current course of events in the region does not project a 
positive picture for the future. Therefore, we need to begin dis-
cussing mechanisms of fast integration of the Syrians into their 
host societies. A major shift has to be made from aid-based to 
rights-based policy making. Instead of treating people as victims, 
we need to understand that they are beings with agency, with the 
ability to come up with tactics in response to strategies created 
by the states. Instead of creating an aid-dependent generation of 
the Syrian population, we need to grant Syrians an environment 
where they can establish their own lives. This can only happen 
by giving them more rights. A beginning can be to end the oxy-
moron of unending temporary protection status in Turkey. An-
other important step is to understand that no agreement can stop 
people from crossing towards Europe if they are determined to 
do so. Turkey, Europe, and the rest of the world have to do more 
to accommodate these people in humane living conditions. They 
are not going back to Syria. They do not want to stay temporary 
any more.
